I. Introduction
Among economists there is general appreciation that transactions costs restrict private contracting, particularly where parties are heterogeneous, information is asymmetric, or there is a need to sequentially adjust contractual terms (Coase 1960; Meade 1971; Williamson 1984) . Correspondingly, if private agreements fail under existing institutions, new institutional forms are developed to facilitate exchange. ' Davis and North (1971) use this argument to explain the emergence of various institutions, as do Alchian and Demsetz (1973) and Libecap (1978) to explain the adoption of particular property rights arrangements. Similarly, certain regulatory policies can be viewed as an effort to reduce transactions costs, which Goldberg (1976) and Williamson (1976) argue must be understood to explain why regulation emerges in particular forms.
This article examines the link between private contracting and regulation from another direction. It analyzes the interdependence between regulatory responses and a breakdown in private contracting. The analysis reveals how the feasible range of regulations is restricted by the same forces that restrict private contracting. The endogeneity of regulation means that if consensus cannot be reached privately, there is no guarantee that regulations to facilitate agreement will be forthcoming because parties will oppose regulatory policies that weaken their bargaining position. This case study of oil field unitization provides insight into both the determination of particular regulatory arrangements and their impact on contracting success. Wiggins and Libecap (1985) show that private negotiation for unitization generally fails and that the primary cause of contractual failure is asymmetrical information across bargaining parties regarding relative oil lease values. Faced with unsuccessful private efforts to unitize oil fields to reduce rent dissipation, the federal and state governments have adopted strikingly different regulatory policies to encourage unitization, with correspondingly different results. Here we examine the differing unitization policies of the federal government, Oklahoma, and Texas. We also examine how the political influence of parties opposed to unitization in private bargaining crucially affected the types of regulations adopted.
Of the three, federal policy is the most effective in promoting unitization because it encourages contracting during exploration rather than after field development. Our analysis reveals that the stage of oil production in which bargaining occurs is critical for contracting success. During exploration, there is little asymmetric information across bargaining parties regarding relative lease values to block agreement. On the other hand, with field development differential information about lease productivity emerges, and disputes arise over lease value and unit shares. This finding is significant for Oklahoma and Texas because, in contrast to the federal government, those states allow for unitization only after oil fields have been discovered and fully developed. In Oklahoma, these problems are partially mitigated by regulations that permit 63 percent of the parties to coerce other firms to join the unit. In Texas, however, unanimous agreement is required. Negotiations in this contracting setting then are most effective when completed behind a veil of ignorance during exploration before development reveals differential information regarding lease values. Wyoming is largely federal land, and we show that it has a much higher proportion of unitized production than Oklahoma or Texas, and that Oklahoma has a greater share than Texas.
The observed policy differences across the three jurisdictions are due to variation in the number and political strength of firms opposed to private unitization. The study reveals that the same firms that resist private unitization agreements also oppose government policies to promote unit contracts. The ability of these firms to block effective policies, despite large aggregate gains from unitization, has broad implications: where private negotiations become mired in dispute, political consensus on effective regulatory policies to complete contracts may be difficult to achieve. Accordingly, regulations that improve efficiency may not emerge.2 Section II describes the gains from unitization and the general contracting problem facing firms attempting to unitize oil fields privately. Section III describes policy differences in Wyoming, Oklahoma, and Texas and examines their impact on the extent and nature of unitization. Section IV links private contracting problems to the political environment for unitization regulation. Section V discusses the general problem of improving resource allocation when there are important heterogeneities and informational uncertainties.
II. Contracting for Unitization Agreement

A. The Gains from Unitization
The production of crude oil displays classic common-property conditions, because of dispersed surface ownership above oil reservoirs, the U.S. policy of reserving mineral rights to surface landowners, and the rule of capture. Landowners grant firms access to the reservoir through leases. Since oil is migratory and the rule of capture assigns property rights only on extraction, each firm has an incentive to drill and drain competitively. The result is excessive wells and rapid extraction rates, leading to premature depletion of natural subsurface pressure. With loss of pressure the natural gas dissolved in the oil comes out of solution, reducing the oil's mobility and leaving significant reserves permanently trapped. The oil that retains some mobility must be artificially lifted at high marginal extraction costs.3
Fieldwide unitization is the most complete solution to this problem. Under unitization production rights are delegated through negotiation to a single firm, the unit operator, with net revenues apportioned among all parties on the field (including those that would otherwise be producing). The operator has an incentive to maximize field rents, sharply curtailing rent dissipation. Unitization results in important economic gains: a time stream of output that more closely approximates the rent-maximizing pattern, increased oil recovery, and reduced wells and other capital costs.4
One can classify oil fields by their natural drive mechanism that forces oil to the surface: gravity, water, and natural gas. While unitization increases production in all types of oil fields, the output effects are particularly important for dissolved gas and gas condensate fields, common in all three states. Gas is dissolved in petroleum or is in liquid form under high pressure in such fields. If development proceeds too rapidly through competitive drilling, subsurface pressures drop, and gas goes out of solution (in dissolved gas fields) or vaporizes (in gas condensate fields). Then, because gas is lighter and travels more quickly than oil, it is expelled first, leading to a too-rapid decline in subsurface pressure per barrel of oil produced.5 As gas is drawn off in ' Discussion of rent dissipation is provided in Libecap and Wiggins (1984) . 4 Measures of any increase in rents due to changes in the time pattern of production are not available, since output was restricted in Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming by state prorationing rules. Because unitization increased the production potential of the affected fields, state agencies, such as the Texas Railroad Commission, were faced with a reallocation problem. With a fixed state production target, any increase in allowed ouput from newly unitized fields under the prorationing rules would require a corresponding reduction elsewhere. Reaction from potential losers to proposed output reallocation was sharp. As a result, the agencies tended to limit the increase to any unit. See, e.g., Oil and Gas Journal (January 7, 1957; June 17, 1957).
5 For example, on the Kelly-Snyder field in Texas extraction on numerous leases between 1947 and 1952 led to a 46 percent drop in subsurface pressure from 3,122 condensate fields, it clogs pore spaces in the reservoir, permanently trapping large quantities of oil. Oil also becomes more viscous and requires more pressure to move it. This results in the premature need for artificial pumping or reinjection of water or gas to drive the oil to the surface, which causes sharply higher marginal extraction costs than if pressures had been maintained.6 Oil Weekly (April 13, 1942; May 3, 1943) estimated that early unitization of solution gas fields would increase recovery from two to five times that of unconstrained production. Similarly, on the Fairway field in Texas it was predicted that unitization would increase oil recovery by 130,000,000 barrels (Oil and Gas Journal, December 7, 1964).
Where complete fieldwide agreement fails, smaller subunits are possible. The gains from complete relative to incomplete units, however, are still significant. Oil and GasJournal (June 17, 1957) estimated 44 percent recovery of original oil in place for fully unitized fields, compared with 39 percent for partially unitized fields. For a small, 100,000,000-barrel reservoir the undiscounted difference in output values in 1957 was over $15,000,000. The potential cost savings from unitization are also indicated by redundant well drilling under competitive production. As of 1937 the American Petroleum Institute estimated that unnecessary wells on East Texas alone cost over $200,000,000 (American Bar Assoc. 1938, p. 256). As we show in Section IV, dense drilling continued for 40 more years in East Texas. Even where fields are partially unitized, capital costs are increased. For instance, efforts to completely unitize the 71,000-acre Slaughter field of west Texas failed, and ultimately 28 separate subunits or operating areas were established, ranging from 80 to 4,380 acres. To prevent migration of oil across subunit boundaries some 427 offsetting water injection wells were sunk along each unit boundary at a cost per well of approximately $360,000, for a total of $156,000,000.7 These wells and related expenses were unneeded for production.
psi to 1,675 psi and a corresponding rise in gas/oil ratios from 870 cu ft per barrel to 1,163 cu ft per barrel. This drop in pressure brought concern about the viability of the Kelly-Snyder field, one of the largest in the state (Oil and Gas Journal, October 27, 1952). 6 There was a rush to unitize the gas condensate Knox-Bromide field in Texas before gas pressures fell below dew (solution) point. The potential problem of viscous oil was emphasized: "Once the liquid clogged the sand near the well bore, there would be no practical way to unclog it" (Oil and Gas Journal, March 26, 1962 
B. Unitization Contracting Issues
The central issue in unitization contracting is agreement on an allocation formula for assigning unit revenues and costs among firms. Shares are based on estimates of each lease's contribution to the unit. In negotiations two serious problems arise: first, unitization contracts must assign once-and-for-all shares at the time the contract is completed; and second, general uncertainty and asymmetrical information regarding relative lease values block consensus on value estimates that determine unit shares.
Once-and-for-all unit shares form a permanent allocation rule, agreed to at the time the unit contract is completed, based on preunitization estimates of relative lease value. Our analysis of unitization in Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming from 1948 through 1975 reveals that contingent updates of unit shares after the unit is operating do not occur. This is because changes in reservoir dynamics and field production after unitization make it generally impossible to determine the lease from which the oil originated or the lease from which it would have been produced without unitization. Such determination is a prerequisite for any revision of lease value estimates and the corresponding unit shares. Before a field is unitized, extraction occurs from each productive lease, but after unitization, the production pattern is fundamentally altered. The field becomes the producing unit, not the lease, and wells are placed to maximize aggregate field returns. Many existing wells are plugged or used solely for injection of water, natural gas, or other substances to drive the oil to the unit's producing wells. These policies change the flow of oil migration in the reservoir, and the lease as a producing unit loses its signifi-cance. Postunitization production, then, cannot be used to infer relative lease values.
While preunitization lease values determine unit shares, information problems block consensus on the estimates. The level of information depends on the stage of production in which contracting occurs. Adelman (1972, pp. 20-36) develops the crucial distinction between exploration and field development and the information available to firms at each stage. In exploration little is known regarding the location of oil and its commercial extraction possibilities. At that time all leases are relatively homogeneous, and unitization agreements are comparatively easy to reach, using simple allocation formulas. Since no party knows whether the formula is to its particular advantage or disadvantage, negotiators can focus on the aggregate gains from unitization. Information problems and distributional concerns, however, arise with development as reserves are proved and expanded. With the initial discovery well and the drilling of subsequent wells, lease heterogeneities emerge. Reservoirs are not uniform, and the information released from a well is descriptive of only the immediate vicinity. Hence, through drilling their individual leases, firms gain knowledge of their portion of the reservoir; the full extent of the deposit and the productive potential of other areas will be revealed only through the drilling activities of other firms.
The production potential and commercial value of a lease are a function of objective variables such as the number of wells and current and past production as well as subjective geological variables, including the amount of oil below lease lines, net oil migration, oil viscosity, permeability of the surrounding medium, and subsurface pressure. These latter variables are the source of contracting problems. Information about them and their significance for lease value estimations depend critically on subjective interpretation by company engineers and nonverifiable company records. While it is difficult to achieve consensus among firms on the implications of such information for lease value, it is nonetheless used by each firm to form private value estimates. The resulting asymmetry in lease value calculations, based on differential information and interpretation among firms, is the primary cause of breakdown in unit share negotiations.
The estimation of static reservoir characteristics such as thickness and porosity illustrates the information problems involved. Each calculation is based on only a small number of observations at well bores. The interpolation of reservoir structure between wells, however, is sensitive to the specific functional forms employed by company engineers. Procedures and estimates vary across firms. For instance, in unit negotiations on the Prentice field in west Texas there were differences in porosity estimates of 60-100 percent. Such disparities helped to delay unit agreement for 9 years (letter, December 11, 1962, Prentice N.E. unit file, company records). The estimation of dynamic reservoir characteristics, such as remaining oil reserves, involves even greater complications.
In addition to the problems of estimating static and dynamic geological characteristics, firms have proprietary information that affects value estimates. Lease production is influenced by firm management policies, details of which are available only from company records. While they are available to the firm's engineers and geologists, they can be easily misrepresented and may not be considered reliable by other firms. Thus, there are important differences in the data and lease values privately assembled and calculated by individual firms and those publicly available for unit negotiations. These differences inhibit agreement between the lease owner and other firms on unit shares.
If private information indicates that estimates of lease values, based on public information, are too low, the firm may not join. If the firm expects future production data to confirm its private value estimates and if its gain in unit share offsets its portion of reservoir damage from delay, the firm will not join. While one can hypothesize a host of solutions to these information problems, in practice they do not appear. Our analysis of unitization contracting from 1948 to 1975 reveals that information problems repeatedly stalled negotiations, suggesting that there were only limited means of eliciting agreement. In addition to these information issues, the firm may also decide to delay joining, if it can obtain concessions from other parties by holding out. In the meantime, nonunitized production shares are determined by relative lease production capabilities, subject to constraints imposed by regulatory authorities.
The central factor affecting the probability of withholding leases in anticipation of subsequent share increases is uncertainty regarding the public estimates of lease value used to assign unit shares. One can think of such estimates as a Bayesian prior that is updated by private information and private assessment of public information. If there is great uncertainty about public estimates, the Bayesian prior is held less strongly, making it more likely that private information or private assessment of public information will lead to divergence in public and private lease value estimates. Owners of leases with highly uncertain public value estimates will strongly prefer to join if their private information is unfavorable. However, if private value estimates exceed public estimates, leading to an expected share revision large enough to offset reservoir losses, then the firm will prefer to delay unit formation.
The most productive, longest-lived leases on a field are most apt to be withheld because they have the greatest uncertainty regarding value. Those leases are more subject to future changes in subsurface conditions and, accordingly, have greater variance in lease value estimates and a higher probability of large divergence between public and private values.8 Firm size, however, also affects the decision to withhold productive leases from the unit. For firms with large field holdings the gains from delay on one lease are likely to be offset by losses on others, reducing the probability that delay will bring a sufficiently large increase in rental share to offset field damage from delay. For small firms with limited field acreage, these aggregate effects are largely external, so they are more likely to withhold their highly productive leases, which have high variance in value estimates. Differences in lease value estimates also block consensus on side payments to draw potential holdouts into agreement because all firms have incentives to claim favorable private information. These information problems decline over time as more public and private information is released through development and expected lease lives shorten; uncertainty about lease values is reduced, and estimates collapse around true parameter values. At that point consensus on fieldwide units becomes more likely. Empirically, we observe that private units are typically agreed to late in field development.
Besides the information issues that particularly affect the owners of small, productive leases, we also show below that small firms had other reasons for opposing unitization. Small lease owners were given preferential drilling permits by regulatory authorities. Those policies allowed such leases to be more densely drilled than larger leases, and with more wells per acre, small lease owners could drain neighboring areas. In unit negotiations such lease owners insisted on protecting their regulation-imposed advantage as a condition for joining.
These information and holdout problems suggest that unanimous agreement for early unitization, when aggregate gains are largest, will be uncommon once development has begun and asymmetric information has been released. If only a few firms do not join, a partial unit can be voluntarily created, but this significantly reduces aggregate gains compared to a fieldwide unit. A minimum threshold of leases must join before a unit can be effective. For firms with numerous leases and significant acreage in a field, this threshold requirement offsets the incentive to withhold productive leases. Since large firms internalize a greater proportion of the aggregate gains from early 8 General contracting issues and the increased residual variance associated with value estimates for highly productive leases are discussed in detail in Wiggins and Libecap (1985) . unitization, they are motivated to expedite agreement by placing all of their leases into the unit. Small firms with limited acreage, on the other hand, will hold out.
A number of implications follow from this discussion: (i) Leases with the greatest uncertainty regarding value will be more likely to desire a delay in unit formation, and these leases tend to be the most productive on a field. (ii) Large firms with diversified lease holdings on a field will be less likely to delay unit formation, ceteris paribus. (iii) Small firms with limited, very productive leases, on the other hand, are more likely to oppose unitization. (iv) Voluntary, private unit agreement will come late in field life. Here, we use these implications for analyzing the impact of private contracting problems on government policy. Since there are clear efficiency gains from unitization and major obstacles to private agreement, there is a potential role for regulatory policy to complete unit contracts. The discussion above, however, shows that the same parties that delay private agreement also have an incentive to oppose regulations that promote unitization. On federal lands unitization typically occurs as follows. First, a potentially productive geological formation is identified and the overlying acreage is unitized for exploration, usually within 6 months. Once unitized, prospecting occurs with costs and returns allocated among the unit parties according to leased acreage, since subsurface characteristics are not yet known. As oil is discovered, the proven areas are separated from unproven areas by the bureau. Leases in proven areas, called participating areas (PAs), share in the returns from the unit on an acreage basis. Leases in unproven areas do not share until their area is proven to have commercial reserves, reducing the hazard to holders of potentially rich leases of rent transfers to less productive leases. The PAs can be expanded or contracted as new production information appears, and the unit is collapsed around the PA when the productive limits of the field have been determined. The unit remains intact through primary production, when output is from natural subsurface pressure, and continues through secondary recovery, when injection of gas or water is necessary to stimulate output. A majority rule is used in forming units. The unit operator must drill throughout the exploratory unit. Firms that believe their leases are neglected can drill wells, demand inclusion in the PA if recoverable oil is found, and receive reimbursement for a multiple of their drilling costs.9
III. Regulatory Policies
Since federal policy encourages early exploratory units before commercial petroleum deposits have been found, it allows for large potential gains from unitization. Early units can restrict the total number of wells drilled and control the pace of production. The allocation arrangements are preset early in field development before information uncertainties and asymmetries appear regarding the interpretation of particular lease characteristics. During exploration very little is known regarding subsurface conditions, and individual bargaining positions are relatively homogeneous. This is the key policy that separates federal regulation from practices in Oklahoma and Texas.
It is important to note that on older federal fields not unitized prior to development, unitization negotiations are protracted and frequently break down in the same way as in Oklahoma and Texas, even though the acreage exemptions still apply. Negotiations are smooth only with exploratory units.10 Hence, information uncertainties and asymmetries are the primary sources of contractual failure in unitization. While we do not model agency behavior, there is clear motivation for federal policy to encourage unitization. As the principal landowner in areas where its regulations apply, the federal government captures a significant share of the increased field rents that result from efficient development. It receives both cash bonuses and royalties from its leases to private firms, and that income stream would rise if field values increased. output with the compiled fieldwide unit list to calculate total unitized production. The data were then presented as a share of total annual state production. Caution, though, is necessary because unit names and field names do not always coincide, particularly in Oklahoma. In those cases it was difficult to assign production to the units, since production data are by field. Accordingly, it is possible that the Oklahoma unit share for some years is too low. ming had 50 percent of its production from fieldwide units as early as 1948, the Oklahoma share was 9 percent, and Texas had no fully unitized production. While the Oklahoma share remains well below that of Wyoming, it is larger than the share in Texas through 1975. These raw data, however, are influenced by a number of other factors, such as the stage of depletion of a state's fields and their size. As fields age and primary production becomes depleted, differences in public and private estimates of lease values converge to true values. Thus, disputes about values decline and negotiations can be completed. Hence, unitization should become more widespread as fields become depleted. Unfortunately, data on the stage of individual reservoir depletion are not generally available. The aggregate stage of depletion of reservoirs in a state, however, can be indicated by the ratio of cumulative production in the state to cumulative production plus remaining estimated reserves (American Petroleum Inst. 1977) Initially, this ratio will be zero, and as the state's reservoirs age, it will approach one. Average reservoir size in a state also influences unitization, since large reservoirs tend to have more heterogeneities across leases and a greater number of producing firms; both should retard agreement. The best available aggregate measure of size is average output per field in each state.
In general, unitization policies in each of the three states will affect the impact of these variables on the extent of unitization. Texas, which has no compulsory unitization law, can be used as a benchmark. In Texas, small changes in field size should not create significant differences in the extent of unitization because of the constraints of the unanimity rule. When field sizes are large, as in Texas, small size changes will not reduce the number of operators sufficiently to bring agreement. Depletion of production, on the other hand, should be a more important determinant of unitization. When an individual field reaches depletion, operators have an incentive to unitize. Oklahoma's law, which does not require unanimity, should substantially alter both of these relationships. As field sizes decline it becomes more likely that the required 63 percent agreement will be reached. Similarly, since depletion is not uniform across a field, only 63 percent of the leases must be depleted before agreement can be reached. The impact of the size and depletion variables in Wyoming is less clear because of federal policy to encourage unitization at exploration. Since a large percentage of production is unitized prior to development, depletion may be less important than in Texas. Nevertheless, federal policy does include compulsion, which should increase the impact of depletion. Early unitization should also reduce the impact of field size in agreement. For the intercept variable, as defined in equation (1), the difference between Wyoming and Texas, however, is clear. The ability to form exploratory units before information asymmetries should lead to a greater share of unitized production independent of either depletion or field size.
We use a simple regression model to test these hypotheses and measure the impact of regulatory policies on differences in the extent of unitization. Let Yit = Po + PI3SIZE-t + P2DEP-t + 13WYO + P4WYODEP.I ? r35WYOSIZEit + 360K + f37OKDEP-t ing the firms that would favor or resist early field unitization and policies to promote it. That discussion shows that property rights to field rents can be fundamentally altered through the unit allocation formula. Hence, a firm's stand on compulsory unitization rules to break private contracting deadlocks depends on its preunitization property rights to oil and how it views unitization will affect them. If the firm expects that its share of unitized field rents under the allocation rule is less than its share of nonunitized field production, it will resist policies to coerce joining. These concerns are most likely to affect small firms, and the sources of their opposition depend on the stage of production.
A. Political Opposition and Support for Unitization Regulation
We argued above that during exploration unitization agreements can be completed with little discord. Since reservoir information is limited, firms do not have any ex ante expected advantages from natural geological conditions. A simple sharing rule based on surface acreage is then possible. This smooth agreement will not occur, however, if there are regulatory advantages provided by state agencies to particular firms that could be undone by the unit sharing rule. Indeed, in Oklahoma and Texas that was the case. Libecap and Wiggins (1984) show that prorationing rules adopted in Oklahoma and Texas in the 1930s to allocate production were designed explicitly to favor small firms. While both states had minimum well-spacing rules, small lease owners were given routine exemptions, particularly in Texas. Moreover, the quota or prorationing rules heavily weighted wells, so that there were more wells and higher output levels per acre allowed on small leases than on large ones. Small firms lobbied for these favorable rules and worked to maintain them. Compulsory unitization legislation, such as that used on federal lands, would have precluded the prorationing advantage of small firms, since unit sharing was on the basis of proven acreage. In addition to these regulation-imposed advantages, small lease owners had other reasons for opposing compulsory unitization after field development. At that time differences in public and private value estimates blocked private agreement on unit shares. The most productive, long-lived leases have the greatest uncertainty regarding value and, hence, are most likely to be considered by owners to be undervalued by public information and the allocation formula. Larger firms, disadvantaged on one lease or on one field by unitization, will nonetheless internalize much of the aggregate gains from widespread agreements, so they will support compulsory unitization regulation. Small firms, on the other hand, with limited but productive leases will not have these offsetting effects and will oppose compulsory unitization of established fields. A majority-imposed allocation rule and forced minority joinder clearly can make small firms worse off by reassigning property rights to field rents. Accordingly, any government policies to promote unitization when private agreements fail will depend critically on the political power of small firms.
B. Small Firms and Compulsory Unitization Efforts on Federal Lands and in Oklahoma and Texas
The federal government was able to adopt its comparatively efficient policies with no recorded political opposition for two reasons: (i) there were relatively fewer small firms and leases on federal lands, and (ii) small firms on federal lands had less influence on policy than did the numerous small firms in Oklahoma or Texas. The number of small firms on federal lands was limited because leases were typically large. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 allowed individual leases of up to 2,560 acres for prospecting and 640 acres for production. Firms could hold multiple leases for a total of 246,080 acres in each state, but that limit was relaxed if the acreage was unitized. The federal government reserved the mineral rights underlying its land and issued large leases because it did not gain from strategic drilling, which was practiced on private land as firms tried to encourage oil flow to their leases. On private lands in Oklahoma and Texas, however, lease size was determined by land ownership, which was much more fragmented, and landowners often further divided their lands into multiple leases to encourage rapid production and drainage. This smooth adoption of unitization was not repeated in either Oklahoma or Texas, where.small lease owners were more prevalent than on federal lands. Small firms resisted private unitization agreements and were the core of opposition to regulations promoting unitization. The conflict between large and small firms over unitization was based on both information problems and prorationing rules that allowed greater production per acre for small lease owners than for large firms. Prorationing rules favoring small firms resulted from their intense political pressure on the legislatures and regulatory agencies in Oklahoma and Texas. To limit drainage and general losses from dense drilling, large firms responded by lobbying for minimum well-spacing rules, forced pooling of leases, and compulsory unitization. Forced pooling allowed small leases to be consolidated into larger tracts for drilling to reduce well densities.
Oklahoma This analysis of the political environment for unitization reveals that the same small, strategically located firms that resisted private agreement also molded policy responses. In Texas, small landowners and firms were numerous and influential, particularly because of the East Texas field, and, as compared to Oklahoma's experience, they successfully delayed spacing, compulsory pooling, and prorationing rules that would have facilitated unitization. Their influence blocked compulsory unitization statutes and led to administrative practices where units could be approved only for pressure maintenance and secondary recovery. In Oklahoma small firms were less politically powerful, and the state's early spacing and pooling regulations limited strategic advantages to small leases from prorationing rules. While small firms could not prevent enactment of a compulsory unit law, their opposition did lead to exemption of old fields and to a requirement that only fully developed fields be unitized. The record in Oklahoma, however, shows that the compulsory provision was commonly used to force holdouts into units. In Texas, on the other hand, fragmented units or subunits were common owing to the unanimity rule. In contrast to either Oklahoma or Texas, federal policy was adopted with no evidence of political opposition. Because of the larger size of federal leases, there were fewer small firms than in Oklahoma or Texas, and their political influence on federal policy was smaller. Moreover, among the three government agencies there were differing incentives for promoting unitization. As landowner the federal government benefited directly from more efficient production, since it received both lease bonuses and royalty payments.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the breakdown of private contracting and the regulatory response to efforts to unitize oil fields. The incentive to contract lies in avoiding rent dissipation associated with common-pool crude oil production. The potential aggregate gains from unitized, single-firm production are large: extraction rates can more fully consider user costs and follow rent-maximizing patterns; capital costs can be reduced through elimination of excessive wells and surface storage; and total oil recovery can be increased since subsurface pressures can be better maintained through controlled oil withdrawal. Private unit negotiations typically fail, nevertheless, because of lease heterogeneities and associated information problems regarding estimates of lease values and holdout strategies. Consensus cannot be reached on net profit shares based on the estimated contribution of individual leases to unit production. These contracting problems become apparent once development has proceeded sufficiently to reveal the sharp differences in production capacities and rents across leases.
The regulatory policies on federal lands surmount these information problems by encouraging unitization prior to development. In Oklahoma and Texas, however, unitization can occur only when fields are fully developed. Successful negotiation requires compensation to reflect strategic advantages, once lease heterogeneities are established. Uncertainty and information asymmetries regarding lease values block agreement on the compensation that must be paid. Hence, unitization occurs much less often in Oklahoma or Texas than on federal lands, though Oklahoma's compulsory unit law results in more unitized production than in Texas. Additionally, Wyoming and Oklahoma laws avoid fragmented or multiple units, which are common in Texas.
More generally, our analysis suggests that policy approaches to contracting problems must concentrate on agreement early, before information advantages lead to differential rents to holdouts. Our study of unitization contracting suggests that when private contracts fail as a result of information asymmetries among firms or, hypothetically, among consumers and firms, regulatory policies may not yield an efficient solution because of political opposition from vested interests. Where such political opposition is influential, regulatory assistance to facilitate contracts may not be forthcoming, as in Texas, or limited, as in Oklahoma. The federal lands case is of general interest because federal policies are effective and, apparently, relatively independent of the political influence of small firms that were influential in Oklahoma and Texas. These observations raise doubt about government's ability to enact policies to increase efficiency when there are serious redistributive consequences and the groups harmed are a major political force.
